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Emily McKillip 
Office of United States Attorney 
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Philadelphia, PA 19106 
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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), 
the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is unconstitutionally vague.  An 
identical residual clause existed until recently in the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.2(a)(2).  Petitioner Thomas Hoffner was sentenced as a 
career offender based on this residual clause in 2002.  He 
seeks our authorization to challenge his sentence via a 
successive habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2).   
 
 The ultimate question is whether Hoffner has a 
meritorious vagueness claim under Johnson.  But that is not 
the question before us now.  The only issue we must decide is 
whether Hoffner has made a “prima facie showing,” 
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28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C), of the pre-filing requirements for 
a successive habeas corpus petition.  To answer this 
seemingly simple question, we must cover some rocky 
terrain.  We consider Johnson and its progeny, as well as the 
pre-filing requirements for a second or successive habeas 
petition.  We conclude that Hoffner has made a prima facie 
showing, and so we will authorize his successive habeas 
petition.1 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background  
 
 In 2002, Hoffner was convicted of conspiracy to 
distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, distribution of 
methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and unlawful use 
of a communication facility, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).  At 
sentencing, the District Court applied the career offender 
guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, based upon two prior 
convictions Hoffner incurred in Pennsylvania state court in 
the 1980s.  The first was for simple assault and the second 
was for burglary, robbery and conspiracy.  He was sentenced 
to twenty years’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised 
release.2   
                                              
 1  For ease of reference, we use “habeas corpus 
petition” or “habeas petition” to refer to a petition filed under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255.  See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 
377 (2003) (referring interchangeably to “habeas motion” and 
“§ 2255 motion”). 
 
 2  Hoffner was sentenced on May 29, 2002 under the 
2001 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(4)(A); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11.  Without the career 
offender guideline, Hoffner’s offense level would have been 
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 Hoffner filed a direct appeal and a habeas corpus 
petition, which we rejected.  United States v. Hoffner, 96 F. 
App’x 85 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Hoffner, No. 00-cr-
00456, 2005 WL 3120269 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2005), appeal 
denied No. 05-5478 (3d Cir. July 18, 2006).  In 2012, he filed 
an unauthorized second habeas corpus petition.  In 2015, he 
filed the pro se motion before us seeking to file a successive 
habeas corpus petition under Johnson.  We appointed 
counsel, requested briefing, and held oral argument.  
 
II. Johnson and Its Progeny 
 
 A. Johnson 
 
 In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered a due 
process challenge to the residual clause of the ACCA, 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The ACCA applies to a 
defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Ordinarily, “the law 
punishes violation of this ban by up to 10 years’ 
imprisonment.”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555 (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(a)(2)).  However, if a defendant is an “armed career 
criminal,” the ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum 
                                                                                                     
34 and his criminal history category IV, for a Guideline range 
of 210 to 262 months.  Applying the career offender guideline 
increased his Guideline range to 360 months to life.  
Continuing the Guideline calculations, the District Court 
found that Hoffner’s criminal history category substantially 
overstated the seriousness of his criminal history.  U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.3.  The District Court departed downward, producing a 
final, mandatory Guideline range of 210 to 262 months. 
5 
 
sentence of fifteen years and a statutory maximum sentence 
of life.  Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)).3 
 
 A defendant is an “armed career criminal” if, in 
relevant part, he “has three or more earlier convictions for a 
‘serious drug offense’ or a ‘violent felony.’”  Id. (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)).  Pre-Johnson, the definition of 
“violent felony” had three clauses—one enumerating 
offenses, one enumerating elements, and the residual clause.  
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).  The residual clause defined a 
crime as a “violent felony” if it “otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also Johnson, 135 
S. Ct. at 2557.   
 
 In Johnson, the Supreme Court struck the ACCA 
residual clause as unconstitutionally vague.  Johnson, 135 
S. Ct. at 2563.  The Court explained that the Fifth 
Amendment’s vagueness doctrine bars the Government from 
“taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a 
criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair 
notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it 
invites arbitrary enforcement.”  Id. at 2556.  These principles 
apply to laws “defining elements of crimes” or “fixing 
sentences.”  Id. at 2557.  The ACCA was a law “fixing 
sentences.”  Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892.  Its residual clause 
denied defendants “fair notice” and “invite[d] arbitrary 
enforcement by judges.”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.  Thus, 
Johnson held that “[i]ncreasing a defendant’s sentence under 
                                              
 3  A sentencing court can depart from the mandatory 
minimum sentence only in limited circumstances.  
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).   
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the clause denies due process of law.”  Id. 
 
 B. Welch 
 
 The Supreme Court quickly resolved the issue of 
Johnson’s retroactivity in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
1257 (2016).  Welch held that Johnson is retroactive to cases 
on collateral review.  Id. at 1264.  
 
 In Welch, the Supreme Court applied the retroactivity 
test set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  Teague 
provides that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure” 
are generally not retroactive to cases on collateral review.  
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 310).  
However, “two categories of decisions . . . fall outside this 
general” retroactivity bar: “new substantive rules” and 
“watershed rules of criminal procedure.”  Id. (emphasis and 
citations omitted).  A procedural rule “regulate[s] only the 
manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.”  Id. at 
1265 (emphasis and citation omitted).  A substantive rule 
“alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the 
law punishes.”  Id. at 1264-65 (citation omitted).4 
 
 Welch held that Johnson is a new “substantive” rule 
because it alters “the substantive reach of the [ACCA]” such 
that a defendant can no longer be sentenced as an armed 
career criminal “based on” the residual clause.  Id. at 1265; 
see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 
(2016).  Conversely, Johnson is not “procedural” because it 
“had nothing to do with the range of permissible methods a 
                                              
 4  We need not address the category “watershed rules 
of criminal procedure.” 
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court might use to determine whether a defendant should be 
sentenced under the [ACCA].”  Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. 
 
 C. Johnson Challenges to the Career Offender  
  Guideline  
 
 From Johnson grew challenges to another residual 
clause, the one contained in the career offender guideline.  
The career offender guideline is a severe sentencing 
enhancement for certain recidivist offenders.  It “specif[ies] a 
sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum 
term.”  28 U.S.C. § 994(h). 
 
 The career offender guideline applies to a defendant 
where, inter alia, “the instant offense of conviction is a felony 
that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense” and “the defendant has at least two prior felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled 
substance offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  Until recently, the 
career offender guideline defined a “crime of violence” as  
 
any offense under federal or state 
law, punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year 
that— 
 
(1) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force against the 
person of another, or  
 
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, 
arson, or extortion, involves use 
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of explosives, or otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.  
 
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 890-91 (2017) 
(emphasis in original) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)).5 
 
 In this definition, the final clause is the residual clause.  
It is identical to the ACCA residual clause struck in Johnson.  
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“or otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another”), with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (“or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another”).  For this reason, the 
residual clause was struck from the career offender guideline 
prospectively, effective August 1, 2016.  U.S.S.G. Supp. App. 
C, Amend. 798.  
 
  1. Booker 
 
 Before its elimination, the residual clause of the career 
offender guideline had been effective since November 1, 
                                              
 5  Beckles quoted the 2006 edition of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 890.  This definition is the 
same as the 2001 edition, under which Hoffner was 
sentenced.  See id. at 890 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(4)(A)).  It is also the same as the 2000 edition, 
which was used to create Hoffner’s Presentence Investigation 
Report. 
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1989.  U.S.S.G. Supp. App. C, Amend. 268.6  Significantly, 
its use spanned two eras in sentencing under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines—the pre- and post-United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), eras.  We pause briefly to 
review this distinction, as it is necessary to our analysis. 
 
 In the earlier, pre-Booker era, the Sentencing 
Guidelines had “the force and effect of laws” and were 
“mandatory and binding on all judges.”  Id. at 233-34.  A 
sentencing court was required to “impose a sentence of the 
kind, and within the range,” set by the Guidelines.  Id. at 234 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).  Although the sentencing court 
could depart from the range, departures were based on “only 
the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official 
commentary of the Sentencing Commission.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b).  “In most cases, as a matter of law, the 
Commission . . .  adequately t[ook] all relevant factors into 
account, and no departure [was] legally permissible.”  
Booker, 543 U.S. at 234. 
 
 In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing 
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 226-27.  In 
a separate, remedial opinion, the Court rendered the 
Guidelines “advisory.”  Id. at 245.  In the current, post-
Booker era, a sentencing court must “consider Guidelines 
ranges” but may “tailor the sentence in light of other statutory 
concerns as well.”  Id. at 245 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).  In 
addition to the Guidelines, a sentencing court considers the 
parties’ arguments and the Section 3553(a) factors; the 
                                              
 6  Previously, the career offender guideline defined a 
“crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.2(1) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1988). 
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appropriate sentence may vary from the range.  United States 
v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
  2. Beckles 
 
 In Beckles, the Supreme Court rejected a Johnson 
challenge to the career offender guideline’s residual clause, as 
applied under the advisory, post-Booker Guidelines.  Beckles, 
137 S. Ct. at 890.  Beckles held that that “the advisory 
Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges.”  Id. 
 
 The issue in Beckles was whether the advisory 
Guidelines “fix the permissible sentences for criminal 
offenses” such that they can be challenged as vague.  Id. at 
892 (emphasis in original).  Beckles held that they do not.  
Rather, the advisory Guidelines “merely guide the exercise of 
a court’s discretion.”  Id.  The Court further explained that the 
two principles governing the vagueness doctrine—notice and 
arbitrary enforcement—do not apply to the advisory 
Guidelines.  Id. at 894.  As to notice, the “‘due process 
concerns that . . . require notice in a world of mandatory 
Guidelines no longer’ apply” when the Guidelines are 
advisory.  Id. (ellipses in original) (quoting Irizarry v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008)).  As to arbitrary 
enforcement, the advisory Guidelines are not “enforced” at 
all, and so cannot be enforced arbitrarily.  Id. at 895. 
 
 Beckles limited its holding to the advisory Guidelines.  
Id. at 890.  It did not address the pre-Booker era, when the 
Sentencing Guidelines were “mandatory and binding on all 
judges,” who were required to sentence within the range.  
Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.  In a concurring opinion in Beckles, 
Justice Sotomayor noted that the majority left “open the 
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question whether defendants sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment before [the Supreme Court’s] decision in 
United States v. Booker—that is, during the period in which 
the Guidelines did ‘fix the permissible range of sentences,’—
may mount vagueness attacks on their sentences.”  Id. at 903 
n.4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).7 
 
III. Second or Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions 
 
 Hoffner was sentenced based upon the career offender 
guideline’s residual clause during the pre-Booker, mandatory 
Guidelines era.  He seeks our authorization to file a 
successive habeas corpus petition challenging his sentence in 
light of Johnson.  We turn then to the requirements for a 
second or successive habeas petition, set forth in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA). 
 
 AEDPA created a statutory “gatekeeping mechanism” 
for second or successive habeas petitions.  Felker v. Turpin, 
518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996) (quotation marks omitted).  For a 
federal prisoner, like Hoffner, a “second or successive motion 
must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the 
appropriate court of appeals.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); see also 
In re Turner, 267 F.3d 225, 227 (3d Cir. 2001).  Section 
                                              
 7  Beckles abrogated in part United States v. 
Calabretta, 831 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2016), a direct appeal in 
which we held that the career offender guideline’s residual 
clause is unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 137 & n.10.  In this 
opinion, we need not parse what portions of Calabretta 
survive Beckles because, as explained below, we are not 
evaluating Hoffner’s claim on the merits. 
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2244(b)(3) is the gatekeeping provision.  Felker, 518 U.S. at 
657.8  It requires a petitioner to “move in the appropriate 
court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to 
consider” a second or successive habeas petition.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(A).  The appellate court “may authorize the 
filing of a second or successive application only if it 
determines that the application makes a prima facie showing” 
of the pre-filing requirements.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C). 
 
 A. Pre-Filing Requirements 
 
 The pre-filing requirements for a second or successive 
habeas petition for a federal prisoner are set forth at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(h).  A Section 2255(h) motion may be based upon 
“newly discovered evidence” or a qualifying “new rule of 
constitutional law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).  For the latter, the 
pre-filing requirements consist of “three prerequisites.”  Tyler 
v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001).  “First, the rule on which 
the claim relies must be a ‘new rule’ of constitutional law; 
second, the rule must have been ‘made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court’; and third, the claim 
must have been ‘previously unavailable.’”  Id.9 
                                              
 8  Section 2244(b)(3) applies directly to a state 
prisoner, without the cross-reference from Section 2255(h).  
Felker, 518 U.S. at 657. 
 
 9  Tyler quoted 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)(A) because it 
involved a state prisoner.  These requirements are “identical” 
to the parallel requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2).  In re 
Olopade, 403 F.3d 159, 162 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005).  “Due to this 
identity of language, we have applied the Tyler holding to 
federal prisoners seeking to file second or successive habeas 
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 Although few in number, the pre-filing requirements 
of Section 2255(h)(2) are difficult to satisfy.  The Supreme 
Court itself must issue the retroactivity decision, either 
expressly or through a series of decisions.  Tyler, 533 U.S. at 
663; see also In re Olopade, 403 F.3d at 162; In re Turner, 
267 F.3d at 229.  Moreover, “because of the interplay 
between” the pre-filing requirements and the statute of 
limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), “an applicant who files a 
second or successive motion seeking to take advantage of a 
new rule of constitutional law will be time barred except in 
the rare case in which this Court announces a new rule of 
constitutional law and makes it retroactive within one year.”  
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005).10   
 
 B. Prima Facie Showing 
 
 In our gatekeeping role, we assess whether the 
                                                                                                     
applications.”  Id.  This is so although there is a slight 
difference between the two sections.  Section 2244(b)(2)(A) 
asks whether a claim “relies on” a qualifying new rule.  
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).  Section 2255(h) asks whether the 
motion “contain[s]” a qualifying new rule.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(h).  In Olopade, we did not deem this to be a “relevant 
portion” of the text.  Olopade, 403 F.3d at 162 n.3; see also 
In re Encinias, 821 F.3d 1224, 1225 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016) (per 
curiam) (equating “contain” with “rel[y] on”). 
 
 10  Johnson is such a “rare case.”  Dodd, 545 U.S. at 
359.  The Supreme Court decided Johnson on June 26, 2015.  
On April 18, 2016, the Court held in Welch that Johnson is 
retroactive. 
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petitioner has satisfied the pre-filing requirements of Section 
2255(h) at only a “prima facie” level.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(C).  Although AEDPA does not define “prima 
facie,” the context of Section 2244(b) confirms that we hold 
the petitioner to a light burden.  The same subsection directs 
us to make our prima facie determination “not later than 30 
days after the filing of the motion.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(D).11  It provides that the “grant or denial of an 
authorization . . . to file a second or successive application 
shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a 
petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(E).  It also provides that after our authorization, 
a district court shall consider anew whether the petitioner has 
“show[n] that the claim satisfies the requirements of this 
section.”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4).  This context demonstrates 
that we “do not have to engage in . . . difficult legal analysis” 
in our gatekeeping role.  Tyler, 533 U.S. at 664. 
 
 Consistent with the text and context, we have defined a 
“prima facie showing” as a “sufficient showing” that the 
petitioner has satisfied the pre-filing requirements “to warrant 
a fuller exploration by the district court.”  Goldblum v. Klem, 
510 F.3d 204, 219 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. 
United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 1997)).  Put 
differently, we authorize a second or successive habeas 
petition where there is some “reasonabl[e] likel[ihood]” that 
the motion satisfies the pre-filing requirements of Section 
2255(h)(2).  Id. at 219 (quoting Bennett, 119 F.3d at 469); see 
also 2-28 Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas 
                                              
 11  The thirty day time limit is “advisory or hortatory 
rather than mandatory.”  In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 335 (6th 
Cir. 1997).  
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Corpus Practice and Procedure § 28.3(d) & n.122 (2015).  
We do not consider the merits of the claim.  In re Pendleton, 
732 F.3d 280, 282 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Goldblum, 
510 F.3d at 219 n.9. 
 
IV.  Analysis 
 
 The parties agree, as they must under Welch, that 
Johnson is “[1] a new rule of constitutional law, [2] made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court, [3] that was previously unavailable.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(h)(2).  These are generally the “three prerequisites” 
for a motion under Section 2255(h).  Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662.  
The Government nevertheless opposes Hoffner’s motion for 
authorization to file a successive habeas petition.  It argues 
that Hoffner has not made a prima facie showing of one 
portion of the first prerequisite, that Johnson is “the rule on 
which the claim relies.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
 A. Relies 
 
 This Court has not previously focused on what is 
required for a claim to “rel[y]” on a qualifying new rule for 
the purposes of Section 2255(h)(2).  Id.  Our precedent 
dictates that the answer cannot be whether the claim has 
merit, because we do not address the merits at all in our 
gatekeeping function.  In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d at 282 n.1; 
Goldblum, 510 F.3d at 219 n.9.  We now hold that whether a 
claim “relies” on a qualifying new rule must be construed 
permissively and flexibly on a case-by-case basis.   
 
 Our interpretation is based first on the text of Section 
2255(h)(2), which supports a permissive and flexible 
16 
 
approach to whether a petitioner “relies” on a qualifying new 
rule.  See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1924 
(2017) (“We begin, as usual, with the statutory text.”).  The 
Supreme Court has enumerated the pre-filing requirements as 
“three prerequisites.”  Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662.  Of these, the 
first is that “the rule on which the claim relies must be a ‘new 
rule’ of constitutional law.”  Id.  While this prerequisite does 
refer to a rule on which the claim “relies,” Tyler does not give 
any freestanding weight to this term.  Id.  Similarly, when we 
described the “relevant portion” of the text, we did not 
include reliance.  Olopade, 403 F.3d at 162 n.3.  Even the 
Government concedes that Section 2255(h)(2) has “no 
express requirement that the ‘new rule’ must actually pertain 
to the petitioner’s claim.”  Br. for Respondent 22 n.6.   
 
 The context of Section 2244(b) also supports 
interpreting “relies” permissibly and flexibly.  See King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (emphasizing that we 
read statutory text in context).  As explained above, Congress 
has mandated that the “grant or denial of an authorization . . . 
shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a 
petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(E); see also Felker, 518 U.S. at 654 (upholding 
this subsection).  This creates an asymmetry in the impact of 
our gatekeeping decision on a particular case.  See Evans-
Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 239 (1st Cir. 2014); 
Ochoa v. Sirmons, 485 F.3d 538, 542 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam).  On one hand, if we erroneously deny 
authorization, the petitioner “will have no opportunity to 
appeal or seek rehearing.”  Evans-Garcia, 744 F.3d at 239.  
On the other hand, “if we err in granting certification, ample 
opportunity for correcting that error will remain.”  Id.  The 
district court will have the opportunity to determine anew 
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whether the petitioner has “show[n] that the claim satisfies 
the requirements of this section,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4), and 
whether the habeas petition has merit, In re Pendleton, 732 
F.3d at 282 n.1; Goldblum, 510 F.3d at 219 n.9.  In turn, we 
may review the district court’s decision.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253. 
 
 At a policy level, a flexible, case-by-case approach 
advances two ends—the need to meet new circumstances as 
they arise, and the need to prevent injustice.  Cf. Holland v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010) (describing these ends in a 
different context).  Both concerns are at the fore in Section 
2255(h)(2) motions.  Such motions may involve rules that are 
“new” (therefore difficult to foresee) and “substantive,” 
thereby involving a particular type of injustice—a “conviction 
or sentence that the Constitution deprives the [Government] 
of power to impose,” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732; cf. id. 
(noting that “the retroactive application of substantive rules 
does not implicate a State’s weighty interests in . . . finality”).   
 
 The above considerations of text, context and equity 
are encapsulated by the scholarly dissenting opinion of Judge 
Elrod in In re Arnick, 826 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(Elrod, J., dissenting).  As Judge Elrod observes, a motion 
“relies” on a qualifying new rule where the rule “substantiates 
the movant’s claim.”  Id.  This is so even if the rule does not 
“conclusively decide[]” the claim or if the petitioner needs a 
“non-frivolous extension of a qualifying rule.”  Id. at 789-90.  
Section 2255(h)(2) does not require that qualifying new rule 
be “the movant’s winning rule,” but “only that the movant 
rely on such a rule.”  Id. at 790 (emphasis in original).   
 
 It is for the district court to evaluate the merits of the 
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second or successive habeas petition in the first instance.  
This includes “whether the invoked new rule should 
ultimately be extended in the way that the movant proposes” 
or whether his “reliance is misplaced.”  Id. at 791.  Other 
Circuits agree.  See, e.g., In re Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225, 231 
(4th Cir. 2016) (holding that “it is for the district court to 
determine whether the new rule extends to the movant’s case, 
not for this court in this proceeding”); In re Williams, 759 
F.3d 66, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that whether the 
qualifying new rule “extends” to the petitioner “goes to the 
merits of the motion and is for the district court, not the court 
of appeals”).  
 
 B. Precedent 
 
  The above considerations dictate that we should apply 
a permissive and flexible, case-by-case approach to deciding 
whether a petitioner “relies” on a qualifying new rule (again, 
at a prima facie level).  Implementing such an approach, we 
look to precedent as a guide while recognizing that future 
“new” rules may be difficult to foresee.  
 
 First, we turn to identical Johnson challenges to the 
career offender guideline’s residual clause in pre-Booker, 
mandatory Guideline cases.  The Second, Sixth, Fourth and 
Tenth Circuits have all authorized second or successive 
habeas petitions challenging this residual clause in light of 
Johnson.  See Vargas, No. 16-2112 (2d Cir. May 8, 2017) 
(authorizing successive habeas petition, as “Beckles did not 
clearly foreclose” petitioner’s Johnson claim under the 
mandatory Guidelines); In re Patrick, 833 F.3d 584, 589 (6th 
Cir. 2016) (holding that petitioner “easily satisf[ied]” the 
prima facie standard); In re Hubbard, 825 F.3d at 231 
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(holding that petitioner made a prima facie showing based 
upon Johnson); In re Encinias, 821 F.3d at 1226 (holding that 
petitioner sufficiently “rel[ied] on” Johnson to permit 
authorization).12  We find these decisions persuasive.13   
 
 We also draw upon decisions authorizing second or 
successive habeas petitions for juveniles sentenced to 
mandatory life without parole under Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 
(2012).14  Most important of these is our own decision 
authorizing second or successive habeas petitions for three 
juvenile offenders in In re Pendelton, 732 F.3d at 283. 
 
 In Pendleton, our Court authorized a successive habeas 
                                              
 12  We acknowledge that only Vargas post-dates 
Beckles, which was decided on March 6, 2017.  However, 
Beckles does not abrogate the other Circuit decisions because, 
inter alia, they involve the pre-Booker, mandatory 
Guidelines. 
 
 13  In contrast, we do not follow the Eleventh Circuit, 
which—contrary to our precedent—resolved a merits 
question in the context of a motion to authorize a second or 
successive habeas petition.  In re Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350, 
1354 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the mandatory career 
offender guideline cannot be challenged as vague). 
 
 14  Graham held that juvenile life-without-parole 
sentences for non-homicide offenses violate the Eighth 
Amendment.  560 U.S. at 82.  Miller held unconstitutional a 
mandatory juvenile life-without-parole sentence for homicide.  
567 U.S. at 465. 
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petition for petitioner Corey Grant, who was sentenced to life 
imprisonment under the mandatory Guidelines after his 
downward departure request was denied.  See Br. for 
Respondent, In re Grant, 732 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 
13-1455), 2013 WL 4505735, *29-31.  The Government 
agreed that Miller was a qualifying new rule.  However, it 
opposed Grant’s motion because his life sentence was 
arguably discretionary, and Miller did not invalidate “a 
discretionary life-without-parole sentence.”  Id. at *36.  The 
Government asserted that Grant could refile “[s]hould the 
Supreme Court someday foreclose such sentences.”  Id.  We 
rejected this argument and authorized the petition based on 
Miller.  In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d at 282 n.1.  We explained 
that “whether Grant actually qualifie[d] for relief under 
Miller” was a merits question for the district court to answer 
in the first instance.  Id. 
 
 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit authorized a successive 
habeas petition for a juvenile sentenced to life without parole 
in In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2010).  The Sparks 
petitioner was convicted of aiding and abetting a carjacking 
resulting in death.  Id. at 260.  Notably, he filed his Section 
2255(h) motion based upon Graham and prior to Miller.  
Because his crime resulted in death, the petitioner was 
arguably seeking to extend Graham to homicide (as the 
Supreme Court would later do in Miller).  Id. at 260 n.1.  The 
Fifth Circuit authorized the petition based upon Graham.  Id.  
 
 The District of Columbia Circuit also authorized a 
successive habeas petition in the case of a petitioner serving 
life without parole in In re Williams, 759 F.3d at 72.  In 
Williams, it was unclear whether the petitioner committed his 
crimes as a juvenile because he had participated in a 
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conspiracy spanning both his juvenile and adult years.  As 
such, the Government argued that the petitioner was not 
relying on Graham and Miller but rather an “extension” of 
those cases.  Id. at 70-71.  Again, the Court rejected this 
argument and held that the petitioner “made a prima facie 
showing that he relie[d] on” Graham and Miller.  Id. at 71.  
Whether those cases “extend[ed]” to the petitioner was a 
merits question for the district court.  Id. at 72; see also id. at 
70-71. 
 
 At the other end of the spectrum, this Court regularly 
declines to authorize second or successive habeas petitions 
that are “foreclosed by our precedent or otherwise frivolous.”  
In re Arnick, 826 F.3d at 790 (Elrod, J., dissenting).  To take 
the obvious example, we have denied Johnson challenges to 
the career offender guideline’s residual clause in advisory 
Guidelines cases as foreclosed by Beckles.  “Certainly a 
movant cannot invoke a new rule by reading it so expansively 
as to contradict binding precedents.  The movant’s requested 
extension also cannot be so facially implausible that he is not 
really ‘relying’ on the new rule at all.”  Id. at 791 (citations 
omitted).   
 
 C. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach 
 
 In contrast to the permissive and flexible, case-by-case 
approach described and illustrated above, the Government 
proposes a different test that would strictly define when a 
petitioner may rely on a qualifying new rule.  Specifically, the 
Government suggests that we take the approach of the Eighth 
Circuit in Donnell v. United States, 826 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 
2016).  We decline to do so.  
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 In Donnell, the petitioner raised a pre-Beckles 
challenge to the career offender guideline’s residual clause 
under the advisory Guidelines.  Id. at 1015.  The Eighth 
Circuit refused to authorize a second or successive habeas 
petition on the ground that the petitioner sought to “extend” 
Johnson.  Id. at 1015.  More specifically, the Court held that 
the petitioner impermissibly “urge[d] the creation of a second 
new rule.”  Id. at 1017.  
 
 The Eighth Circuit’s approach is inconsistent with the 
text of Section 2255(h)(2), which contains only “three 
prerequisites,” Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662, and no requirement 
that we scrutinize a motion to see if it would produce a 
“second new rule.”  Nor does the context of Section 2244(b) 
support such a position.  As stated above, we ordinarily rule 
on a Section 2255(h)(2) motion within thirty days, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(D), and without the possibility of a “petition for 
rehearing or for a writ of certiorari,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(E).  As the Supreme Court has observed, we do 
not “have to engage in . . . difficult legal analysis” under such 
cramped conditions.  Tyler, 533 U.S. at 664.   
 
 The Eighth Circuit’s approach may be simple to state, 
but it epitomizes a “difficult” analysis in practice.  Although 
Donnell does not cite Teague, the way to determine whether a 
Section 2255(h) motion “urges the creation of a second new 
rule,” Donnell, 826 F.3d at 1017, is to undertake a Teague 
analysis.  The Government agrees.  See Br. for Respondent 35 
(“The rule that Hoffner seeks to establish . . . is a ‘new’ 
constitutional rule, because the invalidity of the guideline’s 
residual clause . . . was not ‘dictated by precedent existing at 
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the time [his] conviction became final.’”).15  Whether a rule is 
                                              
 15  The Government quotes Chaidez v. United States, 
568 U.S. 342, 347-48 (2013), which more completely 
explains that a “new” rule under Teague is one that 
 
“breaks new ground or imposes a 
new obligation” on the 
government.  “To put it 
differently,” . . . “a case 
announces a new rule if the result 
was not dictated by precedent 
existing at the time the 
defendant’s conviction became 
final.”  And a holding is not so 
dictated . . . unless it would have 
been “apparent to all reasonable 
jurists.”   
 
But that account has a flipside.  
Teague also made clear that a case 
does not “announce a new rule . . . 
[when] it ‘[is] merely an 
application of the principle that 
governed’” a prior decision to a 
different set of facts.  As Justice 
Kennedy has explained, “[w]here 
the beginning point” of our 
analysis is a rule of “general 
application, a rule designed for 
the specific purpose of evaluating 
a myriad of factual contexts, it 
will be the infrequent case that 
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“new” under Teague is often uncertain.  As a leading treatise 
puts it, a “review of circuit court decisions applying Teague 
reveals little to distinguish the rules that have been 
denominated ‘new’ from those deemed not to be ‘new.’  
Indeed, it has become increasingly commonplace to find 
inter- or intra-circuit conflicts as to whether a particular rule 
is or is not ‘new.’  Such conflicts may linger for years before 
the Supreme Court eventually steps in to resolve the matter.”  
2-25 Hertz & Liebman, supra, § 25.5 (citations omitted).  The 
search for a “second new rule” is thus ill-suited to the context 
of Section 2244(b).  We decline to adopt the Donnell 
approach and need not determine whether applying Johnson 
to Hoffner would create a “second new rule.”   
 
 Instead, we consider Hoffner’s motion permissively 
and flexibly, with precedent as a guide.  Like the Second, 
Sixth, Fourth and Tenth Circuits, we conclude that Hoffner 
has made a “prima facie showing,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(C), that he relies on Johnson.  See Vargas, No. 
16-2112 (2d Cir. May 8, 2017); In re Patrick, 833 F.3d at 
589; In re Hubbard, 825 F.3d at 231; In re Encinias, 821 F.3d 
at 1226.  We will therefore authorize Hoffner to file a 
successive habeas corpus petition.  It will be for the District 
Court to determine in the first instance whether his petition 
has merit. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
yields a result so novel that it 
forges a new rule, one not dictated 
by precedent.” 
 
Id. at 347-48 (citations omitted). 
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V. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Hoffner’s 
Section 2255(h) motion and authorize him to file a successive 
habeas corpus petition in the District Court. 
